Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 79 | Issue 3

Article 5

4-1-2004

The Implications of Using the Medical Expense
Deduction of I.R.C. 213 to Subsidize Assisted
Reproductive Technology
Anna L. Benjamin

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Anna L. Benjamin, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. 213 to Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1117 (2004).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol79/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF USING THE
MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION OF
I.R.C. § 213 TO SUBSIDIZE ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Anna L. Benjamin*
INTRODUCTION

For millions of people, the dream of becoming a parent represents life's ultimate goal. Some couples achieve this dream through
little more than good timing or even a happy accident. But, for a
growing number of men and women, conceiving a child remains an
elusive ambition.1 Infertility is as old as the Bible, 2 yet modem
medicine provides options for infertile couples that would astound
past generations. 3 Science can now combine sperm and egg to begin
life in a laboratory, 4 and many couples choose to endure every medical possibility for the chance to create a new life.
*
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1 See James B. Roche, After Bragdon v. Abbot: Why Legislation is Still Needed to
Mandate Infertility Insurance, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 215 (2002); Thomas D. Flanigan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Insurance Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777, 777 (2000) ("One study estimates the number
of American couples dealing with infertility will be 6.3 million in the year 2000, and
approximately 7.7 million in 2025."); Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility
and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 5 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 193 (2001).
2 "Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children.., and Sarai said unto Abram,
Behold now, the LORD hath restrained me from bearing .... " Genesis 16:1-2.
3 See, e.g.,
Aaron C. McKee, Note, The American Dream-2.5 Kids and a White Picket
Fence: The Need for Federal Legislation to Protect the Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 191, 194 (2000).
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See id.
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Yet this advanced technology comes with a hefty price tag. 5 Funding a chance to become a parent can break the bank. 6 Health insurance, the traditional answer to medical catastrophes, provides little to
no coverage for assisted reproductive technologies, or ART. 7 This
forces the vast majority of infertile couples who undergo ART to pay
thousands of dollars, out of pocket, to pursue their goal of
parenthood. 8
Existing simultaneously with man's inherent urge to reproduce is
the mundane arena of federal income taxes-an unlikely combination, for certain. Yet Congress has created provisions in the Tax Code
to aid taxpayers in special circumstances. 9 These provisions, called tax
expenditures, act as revenue losses for the federal government in order to grant special tax relief to certain taxpayers.10 Additionally, tax
expenditures may exist in an attempt to accurately reflect the income
of the taxpayer," such as the exclusion of scholarship income from
one's taxable base.12
Tax policy and infertility collide in I.R.C. § 213, the deduction for
extraordinary medical expenses.' 3 Generally, taxpayers may deduct
out of pocket expenses for medical treatment that exceeds a percentage based numerical floor from their annual incomes. 14 This Note
will trace the use of ART as a response to the infertility crisis, point out
the characteristics that make ART an "ideal" expense for the § 213
deduction, and then examine the implications of the intersection between the medical expense deduction and fertility treatment. Specifically, Part I sets forth the problem of infertility in America, the
treatments, and the financial costs. Part II examines the current state
of insurance coverage of fertility treatments, including an overview of
the response from the Americans with Disabilities Act. Part III posits
why assisted reproductive technologies present an exemplary case for
the use of the § 213 deduction. Part IV addresses the implications of
using the present deduction to subsidize fertility treatment. Finally,
this Note concludes by offering a solution that allows for the use of
5
6
7
8
9
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See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 26-32, 154-55 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
See ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS
TAXATION 163 (5th ed. 2002).
Id.
See GUNN & WARD, supra note 9, at 166.
See I.R.C. § 117 (2000).
Id. § 213.
Id. § 213(a).
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the medical expense deduction in a manner consistent with both legislative goals and the personal welfare of millions of individuals who
cannot conceive a child.
I.

INFERTILITY IN AMERICA: PREVALENCE, TREATMENT,
AND FINANCIAL COSTS

One of the most tragic experiences that a couple may face is the
physical inability to bear children. Infertility is medically defined as
the failure to conceive within one year of unprotected intercourse or
the inability to carry a pregnancy to full term. 15 Under this definition,
infertility affects over six million American couples, 16 or ten percent
of Americans of reproductive age. 17 Infertility is on the rise in this
country, placing an increasing number of people into a monthly cycle
of hope and despair.18
Fortunately, modern reproductive treatments have provided the
answer for a growing number of couples.1 9 It is estimated that almost
two million people take advantage of some type of infertility service
annually. 20 These infertility treatments include drug therapy, artificial
insemination, gestational carriers, and a group of embryo transfer
technologies known collectively as assisted reproductive technologies,
or ART. 2 1 ART consists of gamete intra fallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intra fallopian transfer (ZIFT), and in vitro fertilization (1VF).22
IVF, GIFT, and ZIT are similar treatments that involve stimulation of
the ovaries, surgical egg retrieval, combining the eggs and sperm in a
laboratory, and development of the embryo in the uterus. 2 3 This era
of technology driven fertility procedures has grown dramatically and
shows no signs of abating-American doctors performed almost thirty
15 McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
16 Roche, supra note 1, at 215.
17 McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
18 Flanigan, supra note 1, at 777; Sato, supra note 1, at 193.
19 For consistency, I refer to infertile couples throughout this Note. Of course,
many single men and women face infertility as individuals, and every concern raised
in this Note applies equally to their plight.
20 Flanigan, supra note 1, at 779.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 780. This Note will focus only on the implications of the use of such
embryo transfer technologies to treat infertility. This is not to undermine the fact
that most infertile couples find cost effective success through fertility drugs and artificial insemination; however, this Note considers the implications of the most extreme
cases of expensive, high-tech fertility treatment only. See id. (noting the effectiveness
of fertility drugs and artificial insemination).
23 See McKee, supra note 3, at 194.
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times more ART procedures in 1998 than in 1985.24 As rates of infertility continue to increase, 25 the potential use of ART seems limitless.
However, most of these advanced fertility treatments are quite
costly. Such costs can be difficult to quantify, especially when intertwined with the costs of diagnosis. 26 Generally, high-tech artificial reproductive technologies cost approximately $10,000 for each
attempt. 2 7 In this country, the estimated cost per IVF cycle in 2001
was $9226,28 and the average success rate of IVF is 20% per cycle. 29
The cost per live birth of a baby conceived with ART has been estimated at close to $60,000, 3 0 yet this figure does not account for the
age of the mother. Since pregnancy rates decline and incidents of
miscarriage rise with age, IVF costs per live birth are estimated at
more than three times higher for women over forty than for women
under thirty. 3 1 Overall, infertile couples spend at least $1 billion dollars every year in their quest to become biological parents-a figure
32
that has increased over 500% in the past two decades.
Infertility is an increasing problem for many American couples.
Modern medicine has advanced significant treatments to address the
issue, but these treatments can break the bank. Even with such a high
price tag, the amount of couples enduring ART grows each year. How
can these couples, desperate to achieve a successful pregnancy, afford
such treatment? Health insurance seems to be the only answer. But
how has the insurance industry responded to the demand for coverage of assisted reproductive technology?

24

Patricia Katz et al., The Economic Impact of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 4
CELL BIOLOGY 1, S29 (2002), available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/
dynapage.taf?file=/fertility/content/full/ncb-nm-fertilitys29.html.
ART procedures
performed in the United States have increased from 2389 in 1985 to 61,294 in 1998.
See id.
25 Erin Lynn Connolly, Note, ConstitutionalIssues Raised by States'Exclusion of Fertility Drugsfrom Medicaid Coverage in Light ofMandated Coverage of Viagra, 54 Vand. L. Rev.
451, 461 & n.55 (2001).
26 Advanced Reproductive Care, Inc., Effectiveness of Treatment with Donor Gametes,
at http://www.arcfertility.com/infertility/treatment-donor-gametes.html (last visited
Feb. 4, 2004).
27 McKee, supra note 3, at 195.
28 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at S30.
29 Advanced Reproductive Care, Inc. supra note 26.
30 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at S30.
31 Id. The median age for women undergoing IVF is thirty-six. Id.
32 Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A.D. Moore, A Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier's
Right to Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 103 n.42 (2001).
NATURE
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THE CURRENT STATE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR
FERTILITY TREATMENT

A.

Federal and State Legislation

Infertile couples who turn to their employer insurance plans to
cover their fertility efforts often encounter a closed door. Only one in
four employers cover some form of fertility services, and ARTs, the
most expensive fertility treatments, are unlikely to be included. 33 As
requests to individual employers have fallen upon deaf ears, proponents of infertility rights turned to the legislature to request fertility
coverage under employer health plans. At both the federal and state
levels, lobbyists have encouraged legislation that requires coverage of
assisted reproductive technology in employee health plans.
Efforts to implement such a sweeping mandate have been unsuccessful at the federal level. For instance, in 2001 Representative Robert Andrews of New Jersey introduced The Equity and Fertility
Coverage Act. 34 The bill was intended to assure equitable treatment

of fertility and impotence in health care coverage under group health
plans and health benefits programs.3 5 In practice, such legislation
would have required insurance providers covering treatment for impotence to cover fertility treatment; however, the provider could have
capped the amount of coverage, or chosen to cover neither impotence nor infertility. 36 House subcommittees on health, labor-management relations, and agency organization considered H.R. 568, yet
the bill failed to emerge from any committee and stalled a month
3
after its initial introduction.

7

Under state legislation, insurance coverage of fertility treatments
tends to be the exception rather than the rule. 38 Only two states, Mas-

sachusetts and Rhode Island, have enacted legislation that requires
broad insurance coverage for fertility treatments. 39 These statutes demand that any policy which includes pregnancy services must also
cover the diagnosis and treatment of infertility. 40 Although thirteen
states mandate some coverage of infertility treatments, these require33 Id. at 104 n.43.
34 The Equity in Fertility Coverage Act of 2001, H.R. 568, 107th Cong. (2001).
35 Id.
36 Id. § 714.
37 See Library of Cong., Bill Summary and Statusfor the 107th Congress, H.R 568, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/dl08query.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with
author).
38 Sato, supra note 1, at 197.
39 Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104 n.44.
40 See id.
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ments do not encompass employer funded health benefit plans because of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 4 1 In the

thirty-seven states without any laws for infertility coverage, infertile
42
couples pay for the treatment largely out of their own pockets.
B.

The Americans with DisabilitiesAct

As advocates of mandatory fertility coverage have found little success in legislating the issue directly, proponents have attempted to apply existing federal legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act, to
the infertile population.
Congress created the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA or the
Act) in 1990 to respond to a history of civil rights discrimination
against the disabled population. 43 Among its numerous provisions,
the Act forbids employers from discriminating in the allocation of
44
workplace benefits between disabled and nondisabled employees.
With the advent of federal protection for disabled workers, infertile women seized upon the legislation as an answer to their medical
needs. In the past decade, infertile women have filed lawsuits against
their employers alleging that certain workplace conditions violate the
ADA. 4 5 Battles have been waged over a television station discharging a
41 Sato, supra note 1, at 197 (explaining the limits of certain state mandates).
42 See id.
43 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (2000).
44 See id. § 12,112. Determining the precise workplace benefits that fall under the
scope of the ADA is a topic unto itself for commentary and controversy. The scope of
such a debate exceeds the inquiry of this Note. The controversy includes such questions as whether insurance plans fall under Title I or Title III of the ADA, what policies constitute discrimination in the context of insurance, whether the ADA governs
the disparate effects of facially neutral policies, and the scope of the ADA's jurisdiction within and across various disabilities. For purposes of this Note, it is enough to
rest on the general consensus that the ADA forbids discrimination against disabled
employees in the receipt of workplace benefits. For insight into this vast arena, see
generally Jeffrey S. Manning, Are Insurance Companies Liable Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 88 CAL. L. REV. 607 (2000) (arguing that the ADA forbids disability
based discrimination in selling insurance policies and defines discrimination as making disability based insurance decisions without consulting actuarial tables); Jesse A.
Langer, Note, Combating DiscriminatoryInsurancePractices: Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2000) (concluding that Title III of the ADA
should be construed as allowing claims for discriminatory insurance practices); Luke
A. Sobota, Comment, Does Title III of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct Regulate Insurance?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (1999) (arguing that the ADA requires only physical
access to public accommodations and does not cover insurance).
45 See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich.
2001); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Neimeier v.
Tri-State Fire Prot. Dist., No. 99-C-7391, 2000 WL 1222207 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2000);
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news anchor for excessive absences during her fertility treatment, 46 a
pharmacist requesting extra sick days to undergo in vitro fertilization, 47 and employees questioning the lack of fertility treatment cover48
age in their employer health plans.
For plaintiffs to win, they must convince the courts of two conditions. First, infertility must constitute a protected disability under the
ADA. Second, the ADA must prevent employers from discriminating
against the disabled by refusing to accommodate fertility treatment in
their insurance plans. In this budding area of the law, most litigation
has focused on the first issue: whether infertility qualifies as a disability
under the ADA. The Supreme Court may have resolved this dispute
over the definition of disability in 1998 with Bragdon v. Abbot,49 yet

questions abound over the applicability of Bragdon to the world of infertility. This Note will now examine the debate over whether the
Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to cover fertility
treatment in their employee insurance plans.
1. Is Infertility a Disability Under the ADA?
For the past decade, courts have encountered the intersection of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the condition of medical infertility. A standard fact pattern for such cases involves an infertile plaintiff alleging that the lack of infertility treatment coverage in an
employee insurance plan violates the ADA. 50 To begin, courts examine whether the infertile plaintiff suffers from a disability as defined by federal legislation. 51 If the infertile plaintiff is not disabled,
52
she cannot find relief under the ADA.
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual." 53 For analysis, we may break the definition into two parts:
Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL 106257 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 10, 1997); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa
1995); Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Zatarain v.
WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995).
46 Zatarain,881 F. Supp. at 241-42.
47 LaPorta, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
48 Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21; Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 105.
49 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
50 Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21; Niemeier, 2000 WL 1222207, at *1; Krauel 915

F. Supp. at 105-06.
51 See supra note 45.
52 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against only
"qualified individual [s] with a disability because of the disability").
53 Id. § 12,102 (2) (A). The statute lists two other parts to the definition. The
term disability also means "a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as
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(1) whether infertility is "a physical or mental impairment," and (2)
whether the impairment interferes with a "major life activity."
One judge found the answer self-evident as he held that infertility
was a clear physical impairment. 54 Other courts give the issue a bit
more reflection, and have looked to the ADA's federal regulations for
help in determining what constitutes a physical or mental impairment.55 Under federal regulations, an impairment is "a physiological
disorder ...affecting one or more of the following body systems[,] ...
[including the] reproductive [system].'56 While a physical abnormality causing infertility satisfies this definition, 5 7 some couples do not
have a medical explanation for their infertility. 58 However, because
courts generally have accepted that infertility is a physical impairment,59 we will assume that the typical infertile plaintiff can satisfy this
first branch of the ADA definition.
If a plaintiff fulfills the first clause of the ADA definition, the next
question turns upon whether infertility substantially limits a major life
activity. Most litigation in fertility cases has centered on whether rehaving such an impairment." Id. § 12,102 (2)(B)-(C). Since most of the litigation
and commentary has focused on the first part of the definition, the inquiry of this
Note will be similarly limited to the first strand.
54 "It defies common sense to say that infertility is not a physiological disorder
.... Pacourek
.
v. Inland Steel Co., 916 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
55 See id.; Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995);
Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 242 (E.D. La. 1995).
56

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (2003).

57 Infertility is a medical condition recognized by the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists and defined as "the inability to conceive within one year or
the inability to carry a pregnancy." McKee, supra note 3, at 192 (quoting I. Ray King,
Treating Infertility Not That Expensive, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL; Oct. 17, 2000, at A9).
58 "Approximately twenty percent of all infertility [sic] cannot be explained." Id.
at 193. Presumably, some of these cases of infertility are due to the inevitable consequences of aging, and not to any physical impairment with the reproductive system.
Under the federal regulations, menopausal infertility would probably not fulfill the
definition of a physical impairment because it is not a physical abnormality of the
reproductive system (assuming that the woman has reached an accepted age for menopause.) See McGraw v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1021 (D. Minn.
1998) (noting that menopause itself is not a disability under the ADA because it is an
"entirely normal consequence of human aging"). But see Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,
117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refraining from addressing the "fascinating question" of whether premature menopause, "the abnormally early onset of an
otherwise normal bodily process," constitutes a disability under the ADA).
59 See, e.g., Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243 ("[T] he Court cannot find as a matter of
law that plaintiff does not have an impairment in the nature of a physiological disorder of the reproductive system.").
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production is a major life activity as defined by the ADA. 60 If reproduction is a major life activity, then infertility fulfills the second
element of the test for a disability.
The question of whether reproduction is a major life activity has
dominated the judicial focus of this field for the past decade, with
federal courts divided on the answer. While the ADA does not define
61
a major life activity, federal regulations enumerate the standards.
The regulation states that "[m] ajor [1] ife [a] ctivities means functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. '' 62 Defendants
have used this definition to argue that Congress meant to exclude reproduction as a major life activity. They claim that the list of examples stresses independent activities, while reproduction requires
participation from two individuals. 6 3 Judges have also used the regulations to hold that reproduction, unlike breathing, seeing, or hearing,
is a lifestyle choice, and not a necessary life activity. 6 4 Courts also distinguish reproduction from the list of other major life activities by its
65
less frequent occurrence.
However, policy problems may arise by denying reproduction the
status of a major life activity. One opinion points out that denying
reproduction the status of a major life activity is inconsistent with protections Congress has afforded to pregnancy and childbearing, in legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act 66 as well as the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 6 7 In light of these federal protections,

a narrow interpretation of reproduction reduces it to nothing more
than a lifestyle choice.
With federal courts divided on the issue of whether reproduction
is a major life activity, the issue was ripe for the Supreme Court to
intervene. They did so, but in a manner quite different than in the
traditional infertility context.

60 See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co, 916 F. Supp. 797, 801-04 (N.D. Ill.
1996);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-08 (S.D. Iowa 1995);
Zatarain, 881 F. Supp. at 243-44.
61 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
62 "Id.
63 See Erickson v Bd. of Governors, 911 F. Supp. 316, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
64 See Krauel, 915 F. Supp. at 106.
65 See id.; Zatarain,881 F. Supp. at 243.
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000); see also Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen &
Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 WL 106257, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 1997).
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Bragdon v. Abbott Ending the Debate?

A specific point of contention marked the debate over whether
infertility met the ADA definition of a disability. Federal courts differed on whether reproduction was a major life activity, and the Supreme Court's answer would have tremendous implications. If
reproduction was a major life activity, then physical impairment substantially limiting reproduction should constitute a disability. Infertility is that physical impairment.
Bragdon v. Abbott 68 was not a debate over infertility. In fact, the
Supreme Court made no mention of infertility in the entire opinion.
Bragdon is a case about the rights of people who are HIV positive
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Sidney Abbott suffered from asymptomatic HIV. 69 She alleged
that her dentist, Randon Bragdon, violated the ADA by refusing to fill
her cavity in his office. 70 To present a valid claim, Ms. Abbott had to
qualify as a person with a disability under the ADA. 7 1 She argued that
her HIV status constituted a disability because it was a physical impairment that substantially limited a major life activity. 72

Her impaired

73
life activity, she argued, was her inability to reproduce.

74
In a five to four decision, the Court agreed with Ms. Abbott.

The Court held that reproduction is a major life activity, and because
HIV substantially limits the ability to reproduce, people suffering from
HIV are disabled under the ADA.7 5 But as the focus of the case was
the disability status of HIV and not of infertility, the applicability of
the opinion to the infertility debate is unclear.
Even with questions regarding Bragdon's applicability to infertility, reproductive rights proponents hailed Bragdon as a tremendous
victory. 76 Some scholars viewed the majority's key holding that reproduction is a major life activity as an end to the debate among lower
courts over the status of infertility as a disability. 77 However, even with
68 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
69 Id. at 628.
70 Id. at 629.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 632-42.
73 Id. at 637. While not physically impossible to reproduce, Ms. Abbott's attempts
to reproduce would pose a severe health risk both to her sexual partner and to her
future child. Id. at 639-40.
74 Id. at 627.
75 See id. at 637-42.
76 Sato, supra note 1,at 189-90.
77 See id.
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Bragdon's definition of reproduction as a major life activity, the legal
battle for ADA protections for infertility continued.
3.

Bragdon's First Test: Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.
A case arose just months after Bragdon that addressed its holding

in the infertility context. In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,78 Rochelle Saks

brought suit against her employer, a book publisher. 79 Ms. Saks suffered from medically diagnosed infertility and underwent costly surgical treatment, which her employer health plan refused to cover.80
Saks sued her employer, Franklin Covey, alleging (1) that she was disabled under the ADA, and (2) that Covey's health benefits plan violated the ADA by discriminating against her disability in excluding
"surgical impregnation procedures" such as in vitro fertilization and
artificial insemination. 8 1
Leading up to the case, legal pundits expected the controversy to
center around the ADA definition of a disability.8 2 As Bragdon held
that reproduction is a major life activity, it seemed logical that the
physical limitation of this major life activity should fulfill the legal definition of a disability. 83 Furthermore, if infertility is a disability, the
ADA should prevent discrimination against infertility in employer
84
health plans.
Much to the surprise of the legal community, the "infertility as a
disability" question provided the beginning of the analysis, but not the
end of the matter. The district judge held that Ms. Saks was indeed
disabled under the ADA because she suffered from infertility, and this
gave her standing to bring the case. 8 5 However, Ms. Saks lost her case
86
on summary judgment.
The court dismissed Ms. Saks' case because she failed to prove
discrimination, a required element for an ADA claim.8 7 Discrimina78 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 316 F.3d
337 (2d Cir., 2003).
79 Id. at 319-21.
80 Id. at 322-23.
81 Id. at 319-21.
82 See Sato, supra note 1, at 208.
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 324.

86
87

Id. at 321.

See id. at 326-27. The ADA prohibits discrimination against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000).
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tion did not exist in her claim because Ms. Saks had equal access to
the same insurance policy as her nondisabled coworkers; the plan excluded coverage for surgical impregnation procedures for every employee, regardless of their fertility status.88 The court relied on
precedent from various circuit courts in holding that "insurance distinctions that apply equally to all insured employees do not discriminate on the basis of disability."8 9 The opinion stressed that insurers
are under no obligation to provide equal benefits across disabilities,
even though the limitation "hits infertile employees like Ms. Saks
-90 Because all employees
harder than it hits other employees ....
faced the same limitation, the court did not find the requisite discrimination necessary for an ADA claim.
Advocates of infertility rights criticized the decision.9 1 Yet Saks
has remained the law for determining the applicability of the ADA to
infertility. While infertility may constitute a disability under the ADA,
the ADA does not require employers to cover fertility treatment in
employee health insurance plans.
III.

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: CONDITIONS RIPE FOR
THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION

As this Note has examined, infertility is a widespread, growing
problem in this country, and assisted reproductive technology is becoming an increasingly popular method to treat infertility. ART is as
costly as it is prevalent, with the price of a live birth estimated at
$60,000 for a single child. 92 With the incidents of fertility treatment
on the rise, how can American couples pay for the expense? Federal
and state laws do not require employers to cover ART in their employee health plans. Spurned by the legislature, fertility advocates attempted to apply the protections of the Americans with Disabilities
Act to infertile couples. After years of litigation and a nod from the
Supreme Court, the current law states that the ADA may protect infertile patients in some areas, but it does not mandate employer health
insurance for fertility treatments.
88

See Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 326-27.

89
90

Id.
Id. at 327.

See, e.g., Valerie Gutmann, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Failureto Cover Does
& ETHICS 314, 316 (2003) ("[A]lthough
Saks can be seen as a step in the right direction by recognizing infertility as a disability
under the ADA, it continues the restriction of coverage under employer benefits
plans."); Sato, supra note 1, at 206-23.
92 See Katz et al., supra note 24, at 530.
91

Not Violate ADA, Title VII, orPDA, 31J.L. MED.
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The answer to this inquiry seems clear: infertile couples pay for
the chance at parenthood out of their own pockets. Statistics show
that patients bear approximately 85% of fertility costs themselves because they lack coverage by health insurance plans. 93 One author described how couples pay for the expensive treatment as follows: "The
first step usually involves exhausting their savings. The next step is
signing up for a host of credit cards and charging up to their credit
94
limit. If they can, they usually then borrow from relatives or friends."
At roughly $60,000 per live birth,9 5 the price of a child can certainly
break the bank, but for many prospective parents, the chance to conceive outweighs any price tag.
However, couples that pay for infertility treatment out of pocket
can find compensation for these expenses in another area. In the
next section, this Note will examine why the nature of fertility treatments creates an ideal situation for the use of a federal income tax
deduction for medical expenses. The remainder of this Note focuses
on both the use and implications of such a deduction in the context
of assisted reproductive technology.
A.

96
The U.S. Federal Income Tax System

Article I, § 8 of the Constitution allows Congress to "lay and col.... ,,97 Since its inception, the
modern income tax has become the federal government's primary
source of revenue. In the year 2000, individual income taxes
amounted to $1.1 trillion dollars in revenue, or 53% of the total reve98
nue of all tax collections.
Yet this amount could be greater. The government has purposely
chosen not to tax the entirety of an individual's gross income. The
Internal Revenue Service taxes only the taxable income of the tax-

lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises

93 Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104.
94 Id. at 104 n.43 (quoting Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle
with Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, at Al).
95 For a discussion on the costs and success of ART, see supra Part I.
96 This extremely simplified view of the federal income tax system is meant to be
the broadest of summaries. I do not suggest that this begins to address the
complexities of the marginal and progressive rate systems, the differences between
itemized or above-the-line deductions, or the decision of taxpayers to itemize their
deductions. For greater detail on these subjects, see Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal
Deductions-A Tax "Ideal"orJust Another "Deal"?, 2002 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1.
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
98 GUNN & WARD, supra note 9, at 5. Other tax collections come from corporate
income tax, employment taxes, estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes. Id.
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payer, and not the gross income-essentially all acquired wealth over

a taxable year. 99
Taxable income is calculated by subtracting a taxpayer's deductions from their gross income. 10 0 Generally, subject to limitations, the
Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to take deductions for certain nonbusiness expenditures and losses.' 0 1 These deductions are
called "personal deductions."10 2 Examples of personal deductions include deductions for alimony, charitable contributions, and medical
costs. 10 3 By deducting, or subtracting, these deductions from a taxpayer's total amount of gross income, the taxpayer is left with a
smaller taxable income. The Internal Revenue Code will tax this
lesser taxable income, essentially forfeiting the deductions that the
Code could levy a tax upon if they were to tax the entire amount of a
taxpayer's gross income.
These revenue losses resulting from federal tax provisions may be
characterized as tax expenditures.10 4 A tax expenditure is a feature of
the tax law that exists to further some nontax goal or to aid taxpayers
in special circumstances. 0 5 Expenditures may take the form of (1)
exclusions, exemptions, and deductions; (2) preferential tax rates; (3)
credits; and (4) deferrals of tax.' 0 6 Expenditures may be viewed as the
equivalent of a simultaneous collection of revenue and a direct
budget outlay of the same amount to the taxpayer.' 0 7 As such, one
may characterize an expenditure as a form of subsidy by the federal
government. Because tax expenditures are generally enacted as permanent legislation, it is important that they be given periodic consideration to determine whether they continue to meet the goals for
10 8
their establishment.
B.

I.tKC. § 213: The Medical Expense Deduction

One example of such a tax expenditure is the deduction for medical expenses from personal taxable income. The income tax deduction for medical expenses was created over sixty years ago under I.R.C.
99
100

See id. at 39.
Id.

101 Id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 165.
105 Id.
106 COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 94th CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES 2 (Comm. Print 1976).
107

Id. at 1.

108

Id. at 2.
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§ 213(a). 10 9 This provision of the Internal Revenue Code states that
"there shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid during the
taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent ... to the extent
that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income." 110
Section 213 allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses for medical care
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or his dependents if insurance does not
cover such expenses.1 11 Qualified expenses can be deducted only to
the extent that they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross in1 12
come, and only if the taxpayer elects to itemize his deductions.
The § 213 tax deduction will cover expenses for fertility treatment' 13 to the extent that such treatment is not covered by insurance,
and to the extent that the treatment exceeds 7.5% of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. As discussed previously, insurance rarely covers fertility treatment. 114 The high cost of such treatment will often
11 5
place these expenses above a taxpayer's 7.5% income floor.
Additionally, the IRS has made it clear in both the text of the
Code and in a supplemental publication that fertility treatment qualifies as a medical expense for the use of the deduction. Section
213(d) (1) (A) defines medical care as amounts paid "for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body."'1 1 6 As discussed previously, courts have struggled over whether to call infertility
a disease." 7 However, fertility treatment certainly seems to satisfy the
requirement of medical care paid for the purpose of affecting a function of the body. In the instance of fertility treatment, such expenses
affect the function of reproduction. As such, the plain language of
§ 213 supports the belief that the deduction covers fertility treatment
expenses.
109 Louis Alan Talley, Medical Expense Deduction: History and Rationale for Past
Changes, 2001 CRS REP. FOR CONG. 1, 2.
110 I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000).
111 Id.
112 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 63(d) (explaining itemized deductions).
113 See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
114 See supra Part II.A. Patients bear 85% of the costs of fertility treatment out of
pocket. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
115 See supra Part I. As a whole, medical expenses must amount to over 7.5% of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income to qualify for the deduction. The 7.5% is a floor;
only expenses that exceed this 7.5% base of adjusted gross income are counted for the
deduction. See I.R.C. § 213(a).
116 I.R.C. § 213 (d)(1)(A).
117 See supra Part II.B.1.
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The IRS addressed this interpretation of § 213 in Publication502,
Medical and Dental Expenses,1 8 by answering the question: "What Medical Expenses are Deductible?" ' "19 In an extensive list of deductible expenses, the IRS includes "Fertility Enhancement."' 20 It states that a
taxpayer "can include in medical expenses the cost of
[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization . . .[and] surgery ....

Both the language of the statute and Publication502 support the claim
that a taxpayer may deduct medical expenses for fertility enhancement, and this deduction appears to include all methods of assisted
reproductive technology.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF USING I.R.C.

§ 213 To

DEDUCT EXPENSES FOR

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY

While the plain language of both the Code and Publication 502
support the conclusion that fertility treatments may be deducted
under the medical expense deduction, it is important to consider the

implications of using the deduction to subsidize any and all fertility
treatment.
A.

Legislative History of I.C.

§ 213

In 1942, Congress introduced the individual income tax deduction for medical expenses into the tax Code. 12 2 Congress created the
deduction during the World War II era to help taxpayers provide for
essential medical services and to keep taxpayers from delaying medical treatment. 2 3 In congressional hearings, Tax Adviser Randolph E.
Paul testified that "'a deduction should be allowed for extraordinary
medical expenses that are in excess of a specified percentage of a family's net income."124 He also testified that the amount should be limited to a specified maximum. 125 In order to be deductible under the
original statute, medical expenses had to exceed 5% of a taxpayer's
118

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION

502,

MEDI-

CAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES (2002). The U.S. Treasury Department creates such publi-

cations to aid the taxpayer in preparing annual returns. See id. at 1.
119 Id. at 4-12.
120 Id. at 6.
121 Id.
122 Talley, supra note 109, at 2.
123 See id. at 3.
124 Id. (quoting Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearingson Revenue Revision of 1942 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong. 1612 (1942) (statement of Randolph
E.Paul, Tax Advisor to the Sec'y of the Treasury)).
125 Id.
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net income and were limited to a maximum deduction of $2500.126
The 5% floor meant that taxpayers could deduct only the medical expenses that were truly "extraordinary," yet the $2500 ceiling reduced
the revenue loss associated with the deduction. 12 7 The medical expense deduction began, and remains, as an exception to the general
12 8
rule that personal expenses should not be deductible.
In the six decades since the original enactment of I.R.C. § 213,
both the floor and the ceiling on the deduction have undergone extensive change. This Note will first trace the legislative history behind
the floor of the deduction.
1. Section 213's Threshold Floor
Shortly after the deduction's original enactment, the legislature
adjusted the threshold limitation. 129 The Revenue Act of 1951 removed the 5% limitation for medical expenses if the taxpayer was over
age sixty-five. 1 30 In passing this amendment, the Committee on Finance saw that the elderly have both a decreased earning capacity and
increased medical expenses, and believed that disallowance of the de131
duction due to a percentage floor could accentuate this hardship.
Without a 5% floor, taxpayers over sixty-five years of age could deduct
even the smallest amounts of medical expenses. In 1954, Congress
continued the trend by lowering the threshold for deductibility from
5% to 3% for taxpayers below age sixty-five. 13 2 As such, early legislative trends apparently aimed to increase the use of the deduction for
medical expenses by lowering the threshold for eligibility.
Yet recent amendments to the medical expense deduction seem
to reflect a change in this policy. In 1982, the eligibility floor for deductible medical expenditures was raised from 3% to 5% of adjusted
gross income. 133 The primary rationale for the change was a concern
that the deduction no longer reflected "'economic hardship, beyond
the individual's control, which reduces the ability to pay Federal in126
127

Id.
See id.

128
129
130
131
132

Id.
See id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.

133 Id. at 10. (citing Social Security Amendments of 1965: Report on H.R 6675 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong. 136-37 (1965)).
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come tax.' '134 In addition, the government did not desire to provide
an incentive for taxpayers to further their health care spending
through extensive deductions for medical expenses. 135 These rationales carried forth to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, when Congress
increased the floor of the deduction to the present 7.5%.136 The rationale for increasing the floor was provided by the Joint Committee
on Taxation:
In raising the deduction floor to 7.5 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income, the Act retains the benefit of deductibility
where an individual incurs extraordinary medical expenses... that
are not reimbursed through health insurance or Medicare. Thus,
the Act continues deductibility if the unreimbursed expenses for a
year are so great that they absorb a substantial portion of the taxpayer's income and hence substantially affect the taxpayer's ability
37
to pay taxes.'
The initial amendments to § 213 attempted to expand the use of
the deduction by lowering the threshold floor. In contrast, since
1982, Congress has attempted to limit the use of the deduction by
raising the floor for eligibility. Currently, taxpayers must spend more
than 7.5% of their adjusted gross income on medical expenses before
the first dollar of expenses may be taken as a deduction. According to
the legislature, such a floor exists so that taxpayers will only deduct
medical expenses that are large enough to substantially affect taxpay138
ers' ability to pay their income taxes.
2.

Considerations of Vertical Inequity

Until now, this Note has considered the 7.5% floor for the medical expense deduction in the abstract. However, using the deduction
for fertility treatment raises interesting effects in its application. As
applied, subsidizing fertility treatment through the medical expense
deduction results in the problem of "vertical inequity." Vertical equity
refers to the relative amount of taxes paid by individuals with different
incomes, and requires that "those with greater ability to pay actually
134

Id. at 11 (quoting JOINT

7

COMM., 9 TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIscAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT oF 1982, at

24-25 (Comm. Print 1983)).
135 See id.
136 Id. at 12.
137

Id. (citing JOINT COMM., 100TH CONG., GENERAL
1986, at 50-51 (Comm. Print 1987)).

REFORM AcT OF

138

See id.
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pay more tax." 139 Accordingly, vertical inequity means that taxpayers
with a lesser ability to pay receive a greater burden of taxation than is
proportional to their ability.1 40 As a policy goal, the Internal Revenue
14
Code should minimize vertical inequity whenever possible. '
However, I.R.C. § 213 promotes vertical inequity by its current
7.5% floor. The Code allows for a personal income tax deduction

only to the extent that medical expenses exceed 7.5% of a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income. In the context of fertility treatment, however,
§ 213 will promote vertical inequity because taxpayers of a higher
bracket are more likely to spend money on expensive, aggressive treatment simply because they have the income to spend. Data supports
the theory that higher income couples spend more of their income on
fertility treatment than lower income couples. 142 This means that the
higher income couples are more likely to exceed the 7.5% threshold
for eligibility to claim the deduction.1 43 Low income taxpayers are
unlikely to qualify for the deduction because they cannot afford to
spend over 7.5% of their income on treatment. As such, the wealthier
infertile taxpayer can both afford expensive, out of pocket ART and
will likely have such treatment subsidized through the tax system,
where her lower income counterpart finds neither benefit. Such vertical inequity contradicts a stated goal of the deduction, which aims to
144
reflect the individual ability to pay income taxes.

139

Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing

Credit, 38 VILL. L. REv. 871, 931 (1993).

140 See id.
141 See Cynthia E. Garabedian, Note, Tax Breaks for HigherEducation: Tax Policy or
Tax Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX Rrv. 217, 230 (1998).
142 See Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: ARTs,
Mistakes, Sex, Race, & Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 38 n.109 (2003) (noting the
socioeconomic discrepancies between income and the use of ART).
143 But see James W. Colliton, The Medical Expense Deduction, 34 WAYNE L. REV.
1307, 1310 (1988). Colliton argues that the 7.5% limitation disproportionately benefits low income taxpayers because a low income taxpayer can exceed 7.5% of his adjusted gross income with lower medical expenses. He notes that a high income
taxpayer may spend exacdy the same amount on medical care, but receive no deduction because he has a higher adjusted gross income. See id. While I agree with this
point generally, I believe that these circumstances change in the realm of assisted
reproductive technology. Low income taxpayers generally do not elect to pay for
these expensive, optional treatments, but the wealthy taxpayers who choose to do so
may receive an added benefit from this deduction if their expenses exceed 7.5% of
their income.
144 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
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Section 213's Cap on Deductibility

In addition to the fluctuating floor, I.R.C. § 213 has undergone
other important amendments throughout its history. Congress enacted the medical expense deduction in 1942 with a cap; the maximum deduction allowed for married taxpayers was $2500.145 This
monetary ceiling was created to prevent incentives for extravagant
health care spending.

1 46

From its creation in the 1940s until the 1960s, this ceiling was
gradually heightened to reflect inflation and the rising costs of health
care. 14 7 In 1965, Congress eliminated the ceiling for the deduction
entirely. 1 48 Yet in eliminating the ceiling, Congress continued to express concern over creating incentives for extravagant medical expenses.' 49 While the legislature was initially concerned with taxpayers
using a limitless deduction as an incentive for medical spending, the
current state of the deduction appears to reflect the realities of an
increasingly expensive health care system.
4.

Risks of Unlimited Fertility Treatment

In a historical context, the present incarnation of § 213 is unique
in that it lacks a ceiling. What this means in the realm of fertility treatment deserves consideration. In theory, a taxpayer can spend an unlimited amount of money on fertility treatment, and so long as the
treatment exceeds 7.5% of her gross income, she can continue to deduct each dollar over the 7.5% base.
However, an unlimited subsidy for fertility treatment may not reflect the goals of this expenditure. Many risks accompany ART, and
these risks increase with the incidents of fertility treatment.15 0 The
likelihood of multiple births and the health complications that accompany such births increase with the use of ART.' 5 1 In this country,
145 Talley, supranote 109, at 2. The maximum deduction for single taxpayers was
$1250. Id. at 3 (citing Revenue Revision of 1942: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 77th Cong. 1613 (1942)).
146 See id.
147 See id. at 2-9.
148 See id. at 9.
149 See id. at 10 (citing Social Security Amendments of 1965: Report on H.R. 6675 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong. 136-37 (1965)).
150 See Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of UnregulatedBiomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 603 (suggesting that society should "reconsider
the safety and effectiveness of fertility drugs in order to combat some of the continuing problems arising from the overly aggressive use of assisted reproductive technologies, especially the health hazards associated with multifetal pregnancies").
151 Id. at 618-24.
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three or more embryos are transferred in 80% of ART cycles; 152 as a
result, over one-third of the IVF births in this country result in multiple births.1 53 Such multiple births generate higher costs than single
births-the result of higher incidents of complications. 154 The average cost for a twin delivery is four times higher than for a single birth,
and charges for a triplet delivery are eleven times higher, averaging
over $100,000.155 It seems problematic that the subsidy of one set of
medical expenses may promote further medical expenses if successful.
Drawbacks to unlimited fertility treatment exist. ART procedures
raise a variety of safety concerns for the mother, including chronic
side effects associated with fertility drugs, an increase in the risks of
certain cancers, complications with the harvesting procedure, and
higher rates of ectopic pregnancies. 156 ARTs are "hardly innocuous
medical interventions." 157 Beyond physical concerns, the psychological anguish and heartbreak of couples that undergo extensive fertility
treatment increases pressure on the family relationship with each passing month. 158 In addition, moral and religious objections exist to the
use of technology that may dispose of fertilized embryos as part of the
159
treatment method.
Certainly, millions of couples voluntarily choose to undergo these
risks for the chance at the immeasurable reward of having a child. Yet
it is a separate consideration whether the federal government should
allow an unlimited, uncapped financial benefit to certain couples who
elect to undergo procedures with considerable risks. As the legislature intended to alleviate the costs of health care by eliminating any
caps to the medical expense deduction, the implications of unlimited
fertility treatment should be considered in evaluating whether § 213
meets its policy goals in this context.
B. Judicial Interpretation: "FunctionalAdequacy"
Until now, this Note has assumed that any fertility treatment may
be easily defined as a medical expense. In reality, the scope of what
the IRS will allow as a medical expense, as well as what they should
allow, is unclear.
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

Katz et al., supra note 24, at S30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Noah, supra note 150, at 620-21.
Id. at 621.
See McKee, supra note 3, at 192.
See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC

CHURCH

§§ 2375-2379 (2d ed. 2000).
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The judiciary has addressed the scope of § 213 in contexts other
than fertility treatment. Generally, taxpayers may take a deduction for
medical expenses no greater than the minimum reasonable cost of
"functionally adequate" treatment.' 60 For example, a taxpayer with a
spinal disorder may deduct the cost of installing a pool at her home
for daily swim therapy, but cannot deduct costs attributable to archi1 61
tectural or aesthetic compatibility of the pool with her home.
The scope of the medical expense deduction presents a problem
in the infertility context, where no quantifiable adequacy exists if the
only possible "cure" is a successful pregnancy. Couples spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on treatments that may carry medical
risks along with the chance for success. 162 Defining these limits
seems to present a problem in the context of infertility, where "functionally adequate" may mean nothing short of any medical expense it
takes to bear a child.
V.

SUGGESTIONS TO BOTH RESTRAIN AND INCREASE THE
DEDUCTIBILITY

OF ART

I.R.C. § 213 allows for the deduction of medical expenses not covered by a taxpayer's insurance. 163 Section 213 only allows for a deduction to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of a taxpayer's
adjusted gross income-yet taxpayers may deduct an unlimited
amount of expenses once they pass this threshold.' 64 Infertility treatment presents unique issues for the § 213 deduction. The high costs
of this elective treatment, along with the 7.5% threshold, place the
deduction out of reach for most low income taxpayers. 16 5 This leads
to a problem of vertical inequity, where wealthy taxpayers are more
likely to receive a subsidy for ART than lower income taxpayers be160

Ferris v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[A]ny costs above

those necessary to produce a functionally adequate facility are not incurred 'for medical care.'").
161 See id.
162 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 150, at 603 (arguing that we should "reconsider the
safety and effectiveness of fertility drugs in order to combat some of the continuing
problems arising from the overly aggressive use of assisted reproductive technologies,
especially the health hazards associated with multifetal pregnancies"); Sherri A. Jayson, Comment, "LovingInfertile Couple Seeks Woman Age 18-31 to Help Have Baby. $6,500
Plus Expenses and a Gift ":Should We Regulate the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies by
Older Women?, 11 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 327, 327-31 (2001) (discussing the extreme
costs of ART).

163
164

I.R.C. § 213(a) (2000).
Id.; see also Ron West, DiagnosePayments for Bigger Medical Expense Deductions, 62
PRAc. TAX STRATEGIES 289, 289 (1999).
165 See Bender, supra note 142, at 38 n.109.
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cause the wealthy can afford to spend a greater percentage of their
income on elective treatment. Such vertical inequity seems contrary
to the deduction's purpose-to reflect a taxpayer's ability to pay.
Besides the current floor, there is the issue of a deduction that
has no limit. Congress eliminated the historical cap on § 213 in part
to reflect the rising costs of health care. But, in the context of infertility, the drawbacks of encouraging infinite fertility treatment must be
considered when assessing the deduction. Unlimited use of ART risks
the physical and emotional well being of infertile women.166 The likelihood of costly and dangerous multiple births also increases with the
use of ART.' 67 An unlimited subsidy for fertility treatment seems contrary to an expenditure which aims to alleviate taxpayer burdens, not
to aggravate them.
It is firmly established that § 213 will be used to deduct medical
expenses for fertility treatment. Yet the unique nature of fertility technology supports certain oversight of the amount of money a taxpayer
should deduct for these expenses. Ultimately, we may look to judicial
interpretation of the deduction itself for the answer. The judiciary
has interpreted § 213 as a way to alleviate the burden for functionally
adequate treatment of a disease or illness,168 rather than as a blank check
for unlimited elective treatment.
As such, taxpayers who intend to use the deduction for fertility
treatment should do so with written consent from a physician.' 69 The
physician must use his or her best medical judgment to determine
what level of treatment constitutes functional adequacy, and this will
vary given the circumstances of the patient. For instance, a physician
may consent to a deduction for more rounds of ART for a young,
healthy female then for a woman past her childbearing years. The
physician would determine the line between functionally adequate
fertility and where such procedures become purely optional or even
experimental. Such a distinction does not prohibit any infertile
couple from purchasing as much fertility treatment as they choose,
but it may address the problems of an unlimited federal subsidy for
treatment that carries risks of harm along with the chance for good.
Additionally, if § 213 is intended to reflect a taxpayer's ability to
pay, then the floor that acts as a gatekeeper to deny access to low
166 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
168 See Ferris v. Comm'r, 582 F.2d. 1112, 1116-18 (7th Cir. 1978).
169 Currently, taxpayers must qualify such expenses as medical only if the IRS conducts an audit on the taxpayer. Ordinarily, taxpayers do not have the burden ofjustifying medical expenses in order to take the deduction. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
supra note 118, at 19.
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income taxpayers must be reduced. While fertility treatment remains
costly and insurance coverage appears unlikely in the near future,
some solace for couples that wish to undergo expensive treatment exists under the medical expense deduction. However, low income
couples may find a 7.5% barrier too high to take advantage of its assistance. As such, this barrier should be lowered to increase access to
the deduction for couples otherwise unable to benefit from the current deduction. Lowering the floor would open the use of the deduction for a greater number of taxpayers struck by the medical
catastrophe of infertility.
CONCLUSION

1 70
Infertility is a prevalent and growing problem in this country.
While infertile couples have an ever-increasing number of treatment
options to choose from, 17 1 most insurance companies have refused to
cover such medical expenses.1 72 As a result, couples pay for the expensive procedures largely out of pocket. 173 The taxpayer may alleviate the burden of costly fertility treatment by using the medical
expense deduction of I.R.C. § 213. The current state of the law suggests that a taxpayer may claim unlimited expenses for fertility technology, but only if the taxpayer can afford to spend over 7.5% percent
of his or her income on such treatment.1 74 Problems arise when using
the deduction as a blank check to compensate taxpayers for their elective procedures; the deduction should be capped at a level consistent
with a physician's assessment of medical adequacy. Yet the purpose
behind the deduction has always been to compensate taxpayers encountering unforeseen medical expenses. The floor of the deduction
should be lowered to increase equality in tax benefits across all income classes, and such lowering follows the deduction's legislative
history.
Ideally, these two suggestions reconcile the unique implications
of using I.R.C. § 213 to subsidize assisted reproductive technology.
While infertility remains an oppressive barrier to the dreams of many
Americans, our nation's tax policies must be subject to consistent evaluation to ensure that they address the needs of all people in the
healthiest possible manner.

170
171
172
173
174

See supra note 1.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
Yamamoto & Moore, supra note 32, at 104.
See West, supra note 164, at 289.

